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Abstract: This paper argues that during the perestroika period the institutionalised 
context of the Soviet higher education governance was transformed dramatically, 
and has attempted to explain the outcomes for higher education from the perestroi-
ka period and proposed the theory of “institutional dis/continuities”. The theory em-
ploys elements of historical institutionalism in the explanation of higher education 
governance changes during the Soviet and post-Soviet periods in the countries un-
der review, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Uzbekistan. Historical institutionalism addresses 
the institutional changes in historical development. The changes are explained by 
“critical junctures”. Therefore, the perestroika period is seen as a critical juncture 
in this paper. They may be caused by times of great uncertainty. The changes were 
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subject to a reference to the Soviet period.
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1. Introduction
This paper aims to provide an understanding of the nature, causes and consequences of the higher 
education (HE) governance changes in three post-Soviet countries—Kazakhstan, Russia and 
Uzbekistan. In doing so, the paper addresses the following research question: What are the continui-
ties and differences of the forms of HE policy-making and HE governance in the Soviet and post-So-
viet periods?
These three countries thought to be analytically suitable for examining the continuities and differ-
ences in HE governance changes since they share much of Soviet legacy in general, while their spe-
ciﬁc patterns and processes in HE development show a considerable variability that begins from the 
perestroika period.
This paper argues that during the perestroika period the institutionalised context of the Soviet HE 
governance was transformed dramatically. Moreover, the new mechanisms of changes would be-
come the causes of greater diversity in the HE system in the USSR as a whole.
There are the country-speciﬁc peculiarities of the Central Asian countries under review which dis-
tinguish them from other republics of the former USSR. In particular, certain perestroika-era anti-
corruption campaigns in the two Central Asian countries led to the leadership changes as “one of the 
ﬁrst tasks for Gorbachev was to change the leadership of the republics to ensure that his reformist 
policies were supported by the republican leadership” (Dadabaev, 2016, p. 189). These events of the 
“Zheltoksan” in Kazakhstan (see below; page 13) and “Cotton Affair” in Uzbekistan (see below; page 
18) became the causes of greater divergences in HE governance between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan 
but also from other Union-Republics. The speciﬁcities of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan can be distin-
guished by comparing with the HE governance changes in Russia.
While both Russia and Kazakhstan endorsed marketisation processes in education either in the 
perestroika or in the immediate post-Soviet periods, Uzbekistan sustained the centralised Soviet 
model of education. It could be argued that the patterns and processes in HE governance changes 
in these countries reﬂect to a large extent, the political and economic systems that have developed 
since the perestroika period.
The paper is structured as follows: section 2 provides the theoretical framework. The following 
section presents a methodological discussion. Section 4 gives a brief overview of the Soviet system 
of HE governance. Section 5 presents the accounts of the dramatic economic, political and social 
changes that were undertaken in the USSR in the perestroika period. Section 5 also traces the major 
transformational processes in Soviet HE during the perestroika period. Section 6 presents empirical 
accounts of changing HE governance patterns and processes in the perestroika and post-Soviet 
Kazakhstan, Russia and Uzbekistan. Section 7 offers a concluding discussion.
2. Theoretical framework
The theoretical framework of this paper emphasises the central importance of the “institutional dis/
continuities” to help trace events. This theory of “institutional dis/continuities” is also useful in ex-
plaining the HE governance changes during the Soviet and post-Soviet periods in the countries under 
review. It draws on the concepts of path-dependency and critical juncture from within historical in-
stitutionalism theory.
The theory of historical institutionalism is helpful in explaining the uniqueness of the outcomes of 
national policies. Institutions are regarded “as the formal or informal procedures, routines, norms 
and conventions embedded in the organizational structure of the polity or political economy” (Hall 
& Taylor, 1996, p. 6).
The notion of path-dependency is the central concept of historical institutionalism. Crucially for my 
argument, path-dependency “rejects the traditional postulate that the same operative forces will 
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generate the same results everywhere in favour of the view that the effect of such forces will be medi-
ated by the contextual features of a given situation often inherited from the past” (Hall & Taylor, 1996, 
p. 9). To put it simply, path-dependency refers to the way in which a current set of decisions is bound-
ed by the decisions that were made in the past. This implies, that “simple transplantation of any kind 
of organisation, structure, curricula, etc., of course would not provide lasting and successful results” 
(Anweiler, 1992, p. 38). Rather, for instance, “educational reforms borrowed from the ‘West’ have of-
ten mutated as they clashed with socialist legacies during the implementation stage” (Silova, 2009, 
p. 315) resulting greater differences between post-socialist countries. Range of responses based on 
national differences, but the argument is that they were fundamentally shaped by the perestroika 
creating local responses to this period of a common socio-economic and political upheaval.
If path-dependency has been used primarily to analyse the stability and persistence of institutions 
over time, the notion of critical juncture within the path-dependency concept has been used to ana-
lyse institutional changes. Thus, periods of continuity are interrupted by “critical junctures”, that is, 
periods of signiﬁcant change from where historical development moves onto a new trajectory, and 
can generate “a situation that is qualitatively different from the ‘normal’ historical development of 
the institutional setting of interest” (Capoccia & Kelemen, 2007, p. 348).
The main argument of this paper is that in the case we are examining, the perestroika period 
though relatively brief, was the critical juncture at which the Soviet society moved onto a qualita-
tively different path of its historical development, and triggered dramatic socio-economic, political 
and educational changes. This represented a radical new trajectory when “the Soviet leadership 
[moved] ﬁrst slowly and lately with rapidity from the organising principles of state socialism to those 
of western capitalist states” (Lane, 1991, p. 96). These junctures are deﬁned as critical because in 
Pierson’s words, “they place institutional arrangements on paths or trajectories, which are then very 
difficult to alter” (Pierson, 2004, p. 135).
This brings us to the question of how to deﬁne the starting point of analysis. In general, previously 
exogenous causal factors have been seen to be responsible for branching points or critical junctures. 
However, Collier and Collier (1991, p. 266) developed a framework for analysing changes and deter-
mined critical junctures as the branching points when “new conditions disrupt or overwhelm the 
speciﬁc mechanisms that previously reproduced the existing path”.
There are two useful perspectives from which critical junctures are analysed, some drawing on the 
notions of “uncertainty” and “contingency” (Capoccia, 2015; Capoccia & Kelemen, 2007), and others 
focusing on “antecedent conditions” and “divergence” (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Slater & 
Simmons, 2010).
In relation to the ﬁrst perspective, by employing the concepts of uncertainty and contingency, 
Capoccia and Kelemen (2007), and Capoccia (2015) seek to conceptualise critical junctures, deﬁning 
them as periods of social and political ﬂuidity. They argue that the moments of uncertainty corre-
spond to the adoption of political choices and decisions of key actors during critical junctures as an 
initial institutional setting on certain path. These choices then persist for a long period of time con-
straining ensuing choices (Capoccia & Kelemen, 2007). Therefore, Capoccia (2015) claims that link-
ing changes to the decisions of policy-makers enables the capture of the policy dynamics when 
certain institutional selection over others took place in this short period of political ﬂux. Thus, critical 
junctures are considered as the starting point for further path-dependent processes, which means 
that the decisions which were made at these points have an enduring inﬂuence on the further de-
velopment of events (Capoccia, 2015; Capoccia & Kelemen, 2007).
This paper employs the concepts of uncertainty and contingency in order to identify the starting 
point of the critical juncture. These concepts are useful in capturing and analysing the major institu-
tional changes in this short period of political ﬂux of the perestroika period. Those changes were 
linked to the policy choices of key policy-makers, Gorbachev—the leader of the Communist Party of 
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the USSR and his close allies, followed by huge uncertainties and the contingencies of events. This is 
particularly relevant in the case of the Soviet Union due to its hierarchical one party system.
In relation to the second perspective; this group of researchers of critical junctures consider the 
antecedent conditions and divergence as analytically more useful. They claim that the main deﬁning 
characteristic of critical juncture is divergence of outcomes across cases (Acemoglu & Robinson, 
2012; Slater & Simmons, 2010). In particular, Slater and Simmons (2010) assert that some anteced-
ent conditions play a causal role in the outcome of interest. Moreover, they use the term critical an-
tecedent in order to distinguish it from other types of antecedent conditions, such as background 
similarities and the descriptive context. They conceptualise the critical antecedents as the causal 
factors or conditions that come before a critical juncture which “can sequentially combine with caus-
al factors during a critical juncture to produce divergent long-term outcomes” (Slater & Simmons, 
2010, p. 889, emphasis in the original). Therefore, it is important to carefully examine whether the 
preceding variations made the cases diverge signiﬁcantly following the critical juncture, thus putting 
them on differing trajectories (Slater & Simmons, 2010). This suggests that it is necessary to take into 
account the fact that the differences may have been in place across the cases before they diverged.
Overall, the paper argues that the concepts of antecedent conditions and divergence can explain 
the post-socialist diversities in education from the very outset of the collapse of the USSR. In the 
case of this paper, the critical antecedents are the different nationalities, religions, and cultures of 
the Union-Republics, and the causal factors of perestroika are the emergent new political and eco-
nomic factors. This study claims that a combination of these causal factors played a decisive role in 
bringing about the diversity of institutional trajectories in education, including HE governance, in 
post-socialist countries.
Thus, the perestroika period is seen as both a cause of, and the starting point of, the long-term 
diversity in education of post-socialist countries, which consequently requires a thorough examina-
tion of the differences which emerged in the perestroika period across the Union-Republics in the 
period before they diverged, that is, before the break-up of the USSR.
3. Methodology
This paper traces the changing processes and patterns of HE governance in the countries under re-
view. Process tracing is deﬁned as a method for “unpacking causality, that aims at studying what 
happens between X and Y and beyond” (Trampusch & Palier, 2016, p. 2). More precisely, Byrne (2012, 
p. 21) asserts that “by a combination of process tracing and systematic comparison, by a historical 
and narrative driven approach to investigating cause, [we can] establish causal patterns”. In process 
tracing, it is not the quantity of evidence that is the most valuable, but the link between the evidence 
and the research question(s). For process tracing, context is important because the outcome of under-
lying mechanisms “depends on the temporal and spatial conditions or even on contingency, which is 
produced by uncertainty” (Trampusch & Palier, 2016, p. 11). Crucially, process tracing requires a good 
familiarity with the history of the outcome of interest. However, the main difference between process 
tracing and historical explanation is that process tracers produce an analytical explanation which re-
quires making the relevant theoretical frameworks explicit (Bennett & Checkel, 2015; George & 
Bennett, 2005; Mahoney, 2015; Trampusch & Palier, 2016). In other words, this research method has 
to be guided by theory in order “either to know in advance where to look for causal mechanisms, or to 
know what causal mechanisms to test empirically” (Trampusch & Palier, 2016, p. 6). Thus, a system-
atic process analysis as process tracing is the most promising method for producing an understanding 
of causation, and also for assessing the capacity of theories to explain outcomes (Hall, 2003).
Thus, in this paper the processes of change are traced in a theoretically informed way. Hence, 
process tracing is the key method “for capturing causal mechanisms in action” (Bennett & Checkel, 
2015, p. 9). Checkel (2005, p. 15) argues that in this step-wise approach the researcher is forced to 
reﬂect on “the connection (or lack thereof) between theoretically expected patterns and what the 
data say”. Moreover, process tracing permits the researcher to bring closer theory and data 
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meaning, creating a continuous interplay between theory and the actual things that are going on in 
reality (Checkel, 2005).
The main objective of this paper is to employ theory to trace the nature and consequences of the 
changing processes and patterns of HE governance in countries under review during the Soviet and 
post-Soviet periods. Data used for process tracing can be gathered from various sources. In this pa-
per, I draw on official governmental documents, such as reports, laws, decrees as well as speeches, 
and memoirs of the officials (Appendix 1). In addition, I also collected data from secondary sources, 
such as books, volumes, journal and newspaper articles, online publications, and conference papers 
can also be examined.
4. Soviet system of HE
The Communist Party was involved in all aspects of Soviet life, unlike the individual Ministries, which 
had responsibility for the administration of speciﬁc branches of the economy. The role of the 
Communist Party was clearly deﬁned for the ﬁrst time in the 1936 USSR Constitution. According to 
Article 126, the Communist Party was the “vanguard of the working people in their struggle to 
strengthen and develop the socialist system and is the leading core of all organizations of the work-
ing people, both public and state” (USSR Constitution, 1936). Under the 1977 (Brezhnev) Constitution, 
the Communist Party’s role was strengthened and it became the “leading and guiding force” of 
Soviet society (USSR Constitution, 1977).
From 1928, the Soviet economy was guided by ﬁve-year plans, which reﬂected the centralised 
nature of decision-making in the USSR. The ﬁrst ﬁve-year plan aimed at achieving rapid industrialisa-
tion of the economy. Therefore, a large number of new engineers were required. Stalin thus de-
manded not only an increase in the number of working class students but also the acceleration “of 
creating a new technical intelligentsia capable of serving our socialist industry” (Stalin, 1928). 
Moreover, following Stalin’s criticism of the HE system in April 1928, a number of reorganisations in 
HE administration were undertaken between 1929 and 1930. University schools were separated and 
put under the supervision of various organisations; for instance, economic schools were placed un-
der the management of Gosplan and Commissariat of Finance, while law and medical schools were 
now to be overseen by the Commissariats of Justice and Health. These organisations were author-
ised to recruit for new positions in accordance with their needs, which had a direct inﬂuence on the 
types of expertise that ﬂourished. Moreover, this new administration model pushed HEIs (Higher 
Education Institutions) into narrow specialisations. Industries were to become ﬁnancially responsi-
ble for HEIs. These changes were deemed “the most expedient way of ensuring the required speed” 
(Stalin, 1928) in the rapid industrialisation of the economy. Overall, the educational programmes in 
higher technical institutions were transformed. From 1930, students were to enrol in their respective 
specialism and to obtain a specialism on their graduation. A model curriculum for each specialism 
was introduced, and in order to qualify as a specialist, the set curriculum needed to be followed. The 
philosophy behind this policy was that a person should perform a speciﬁc task in order to be useful 
to society.
As a result, HE became an indissoluble part of the overall economic complex of the Soviet Union.
In discussing the underlying rationale of this stage in the reorganisation of HE 
administration, it bears mentioning that the industrial sector, or branch, approach to cadre 
training led to a shift of emphasis towards the production of so-called prepared specialists, 
i.e. persons whose knowledge and skills were shaped according to a pre-established 
recipe, as a set of ready-made solutions permitting the application of knowledge within set 
parameter of industrial activity. (Eliutin, 1984, p. 22)
Major changes in the political and economic agenda affected the educational area, in particular the 
HE system. The 20th Congress of the Communist Party in February 1956 opened a campaign for 
closer ties between HE and production. The study-work combination claimed to have signiﬁcant 
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effects both on education and production. This was considered to be part of a holistic transforma-
tion, where the ultimate objective of the process was the elimination of the differences between 
mental and physical labour (Eliutin, 1959).
Following the decision of the Communist Party’s 20th Congress on closer ties between HE and 
production, HEIs were moved from the central cities to locatixons in more industrial regions. This 
meant that HEIs became closer to the immediate work places of those future specialists. Moreover, 
in accordance with the territorial administration policy, most HEIs were governed by the authorities 
of the individual Union-Republics and economic regions. For instance, all 25 HEIs of the Kazakh SSR 
were subordinated to the Republic’s administration (De Witt, 1961). The stated purpose of this policy 
was to bring HEIs closer “to the areas of productive forces and the partial unloading of the old uni-
versity centres” (Eliutin, 1967, p. 128). Khrushchov proposed to “proletarianise” non-working class 
origin students by requiring them to undertake a period of full-time employment. Only then were 
they to be permitted entrance into HE (Khrushchov, 1958).
However, after Khrushchev’s dismissal from office by the Politburo in 1964, his reforms were grad-
ually reversed. In the HE system, the reforms focusing on the connection of HE and production, and 
on the expansion of HE relations with practice were subsequently abolished. As a result, HE admin-
istration became over-centralised.
The Union-Republic Ministry of HSSE (Higher Secondary Specialised Education) retained the gen-
eral organisational and methodological supervision over all HEIs in the USSR through the 15 
Ministries of HSSE of the Union-Republics. In fact, Republican ministries became the branch offices 
of the Union-Republic Ministry. A number of HEIs in the Union-Republics were subordinated directly 
to the Union-Republic Ministry of HSSE in accordance with the decree of the Central Committee of 
the Communist Party and the Council of Ministers of the USSR (Statute of the Ministry of HSSE of the 
USSR, 1968).
Overall, from 1970 onwards, the inﬂuence of the Communist Party was strengthened in every as-
pect of HE, including operational management of research and teaching via integrating primary 
party organisations as a result of the reorganisation of the purpose and processes of HE. Political reli-
ability became the main factor in the selection and placement of teaching staff.
Thus, one-party Soviet system was structured vertically with socio-economic development plans 
of the state, which included provisions also for the HE system. However, the outcomes of the 
Communist Party policies largely depended on historical legacies of the Union-Republics. For in-
stance, the share of native women in Central Asian HEIs was insigniﬁcant which was seen as an in-
ﬂuence of local customs of Central Asia (De Witt, 1961). On the other hand, in Uzbekistan, the overall 
proportion students in HEIs from the titular nationality was below the share of that nationality in the 
total population in comparison with Russian origin students which was signiﬁcantly greater than 
that of Russians among the total population (Bilinsky, 1968). Obviously, a uniform Russian language 
instruction in most of Soviet HEIs hampered HE access for native nationalities, for example, “Kazakh 
secondary school graduates complained that they had difficulty in getting admitted to institutions 
in higher learning in Kazakhstan because they were required to pass an entrance examination in 
Russian language and literature” (Bilinsky, 1968, p. 429). Above all, a free HE system in the Soviet 
Union also created improper practices in the selection process of students, such as when their par-
ents and relatives had an inﬂuence in gaining access to HE for them.
Thus, it could be argued that even in the case of the uniform Soviet HE governance differences in 
performance and implementation existed before the perestroika period shaped by different contexts 
within which these higher educational institutions operated.
Page 7 of 18
Azimbayeva, Cogent Education (2017), 4: 1399968
https://doi.org/10.1080/2331186X.2017.1399968
5. Perestroika in the USSR
At the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party held in April of 1985, the Party 
leader, Gorbachev, initiated “signiﬁcant new departures in Soviet domestic and foreign policies” 
(Lapidus, 1988, p. 1). This period lasted for almost 7 years, and is known as perestroika, which means 
“restructuring”. However, restructuring began without a premeditated plan; Gorbachev “did not con-
ceive of his reform programme all at once. Certainly its enunciation only unfolded step by step, prob-
ably in response to events and problems as they emerged” (Daniels, 1990, p. 237).
From 1985–1987, the course was presented in the materials of the April Plenum of the Central 
Committee in 1985 and in the 27th Congress of the Communist Party in February 1986. Initially, 
“restructuring” meant mainly two things: uskorenie, acceleration of socio-economic development of 
the country and glasnost, which means openness of decision-making and access to information. The 
acceleration was understood as a means to increase the rate of economic growth, which was stead-
ily decreasing. According to Lane (1992, p. 9), “the average increase in GNP was 8.9% for 1966–1970; 
6.3% for 1971–1975; 4.7% for 1976–1980; and 4.0% for 1981–1983”. The mechanism of economic 
growth was based on three Union laws: the Law on Individual Labour Activity, passed on 19 
November 1986; the Law on State Enterprises, adopted in June 1987; and the Law on Co-operatives, 
which came into force on 1 July 1988.
Signiﬁcant political reforms followed the 19th Conference of the Communist Party in June 1988, 
when Gorbachev proposed a new supreme authority, the Soviet of People’s Deputies. This change 
signiﬁed a transition towards a multiparty system. Consequently, the position of the Communist 
Party as the leading and guiding force in society was removed from Article 6 of the USSR Constitution. 
By the end of 1990, all the Union-Republics had adopted the Declaration of sovereignty. This implied 
that the status of national laws was higher than the status of laws imposed by Moscow, which in 
practice meant that Union-Republics refused “to honour Soviet laws unless they were endorsed by 
republican legislatures” (Strayer, 1998, p. 151).
Overall, the perestroika reforms had not yielded the intended results. Rather, “in the grandest of 
ironies, those very reforms seemed to deal the Soviet system a fatal blow” (Strayer, 1998, p. 86).
The educational system was not excluded from the perestroika reforms. Indeed, it faced all the 
contradictions generated by such volatile policy-making and socio-economic conditions. In addition, 
“the proportion of the state budget allocated to HE declined from 1.47% in 1965 to 0.97% in 1986” 
(Lane, 1992, p. 299) in the USSR.
The task of restructuring higher and secondary special education was set at the 27th Congress of 
the USSR Communist Party, held on 25 February 1986. This reorganisation of HE was seen as “one of 
the imperative tasks aimed at speeding up the country’s socio-economic development” (Prokhorov, 
1987, p. 16). The key mechanism of the main transformations of the HE system was the “Basic 
Directions for the Restructuring of Higher and Specialised Secondary Education in the Country”. The 
most important direction and the main lever of HE restructuring was considered to be a close inte-
gration between HE, science and production by means of a transition to the new principles of their 
relationship—a direct contractual relationship (Lane, 1992; Savelyev, Zuev, & Galagan, 1990). This 
means that “a sort of market relationship will develop between vuzy [higher educational institu-
tions], enterprises and research institutes” (Avis, 1990, p. 7). This implied that higher educational 
institutions had to be able “to ‘sell’ their research to industry, which means that in applied ﬁelds, 
institutes will increasingly have to ﬁnd their own sources of funding or be dissolved” (Lane, 1992, p. 
301). However, the Soviet enterprises were themselves struggling “to cope with a new world of eco-
nomic self-ﬁnancing/cost accounting, [and] diverting funds to educational purposes often seems a 
luxury” (Balzer, 1992, p. 170). A contract form of relationship was established between the state and 
HEIs, which was regulated by the State Educational Order, with the aim of centralising the education 
of specialists. The State Order allocation of resources was to be made centrally and on priority basis 
(Savelyev, Zuev, & Galagan, 1990).
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The next phase of perestroika led to the emergence of new political and economic factors that had 
to be taken into account in order to reform higher educational institutions. The basic principles of 
new educational policy were formulated at the All-Union Congress of Educators, which was held in 
late 1988. The main prospects for reforming the educational system became: democratisation of the 
system; decentralisation of administration; and the empowerment and greater independence of 
educational institutions through the establishment of state-public administration in the educational 
system (All-Union Congress of Educators 1990). Furthermore, the structure of the educational sys-
tem underwent fundamental changes at the All-Union level in 1988. The State Committee for Public 
Education was created to replace three educational authorities, namely the USSR Ministry of 
Education, the USSR Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialised Education, and the USSR State 
Committee for Vocational-Technical Education.
Given resource shortages and political reforms, the reform initiative and authority over the educa-
tional system were increasingly delegated to the Union-Republics and regions of the USSR. The HE 
restructuring programmes of 1986–1987 and 1988 were the last centrally directed reform initiatives 
(Balzer, 1991). Overall, the 4th World Congress on Soviet and East European Studies held in July 1990 
recognised that “1990 marked the end of the time when one could write anything serious about Soviet 
education as a whole. Future efforts will need to adopt a more localist approach” (Kerr, 1990, p. 29).
The All-Union sociological survey “Higher Education: The Conception and Practice of Perestroika” 
which was conducted in November–December 1990, showed a widespread belief among academics, 
officials, and researchers of higher educational institutions that the market was capable of solving 
all the problems of HE (Higher Education. The Conception & Practice of Perestroika, 1991). Thus, for 
instance, the majority of participants saw a signiﬁcant source of funding from the introduction of tui-
tion fees. Furthermore, 71% of the supporters of a HE market and 20% of its opponents advocated 
converting higher educational institutions “to full cost accounting and even proﬁtability” (Higher 
Education. The Conception & Practice of Perestroika, 1991, p. 37).
On the whole, there were already indications of “disillusionment with the results of administrative 
reorganisation, and it is for this reason that only 16% of respondents perceived democratisation of 
the administration of higher educational institutions as the most effective method of dealing with 
the problems. […] [T]he process of democratisation of life in the higher educational institutions does 
not so much solve problems as generate them” (Higher Education. The Conception & Practice of 
Perestroika, 1991, p. 27). Consequently, there was “often a kind of plaintive request that central 
power be exerted “just once more”, so as to assure that a new, more responsive and “more demo-
cratic” system is installed” (Kerr, 1992, p. 489). However, the strongest emphasis was placed on the 
republic-level ministries (Higher Education. The Conception & Practice of Perestroika, 1991).
6. Institutional dis/continuities of the Perestroika in HE governance in Kazakhstan, 
Russia and Uzbekistan
The previous section demonstrated that during the perestroika period the institutionalised context 
of the Soviet HE governance was transformed dramatically. Moreover, the new mechanisms of 
changes would become the causes of greater diversity in the HE system in the USSR as a whole. Thus, 
the main focus of this section is to examine the empirical accounts of the changing nature of gov-
ernance during the perestroika and post-Soviet periods in Kazakhstan, Russia and Uzbekistan.
6.1. Kazakhstan
During the early years of Gorbachev’s perestroika reforms, in December 1986, a massive protest of 
mostly young, ethnic Kazakhs, was held in Almaty. The protest lasted several days. The protesters 
criticised Gorbachev’s decision to replace the Communist Party leader of Kazakhstan, Dinmukhamed 
Kunayev. He was replaced by Genadyi Kolbin, “an ethnic Russian considered an outsider in Kazakhstan 
in terms of both his ethnic origin and experience in Kazakhstan” (Kunaev, 1992, p. 269). The demon-
stration was suppressed by Soviet security forces. Thousands were arrested, and many jailed. 
Consequently, many officials and policy-makers in local government and in HE were dismissed. 
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Nevertheless, spontaneous protests spread to other regions of Kazakhstan resulting “in increased 
Kazakh nationalism paired with economic stagnation” (Dadabaev, 2016, p. 191).
In March 1990, Supreme Soviet elections of the Kazakh SSR were held and 94.4% of those elected 
were the Communist Party members. This Supreme Soviet adopted the Law on Education and the 
Law on HE in 1992 and 1993, respectively. The policies of liberalisation and structural transformation 
of the economy, launched in Kazakhstan 1990–1991, were continued in the post-Soviet period.
In June 1992, a “Strategy for the Establishment and Development of Kazakhstan as a Sovereign 
State” was adopted by President Nursultan Nazarbayev. Under the strategy, the share of state own-
ership had to be reduced to 30–40%. Furthermore, in 1993 Kazakhstan experienced a four-digit inﬂa-
tion rate which “continued to be so until 1994” (Akanov & Suzhikova, 1998, p. 236). The large 
international ﬁnancial institutions—the IMF, the World Bank (WB) and donor countries—had a strong 
inﬂuence on developing and implementing economic policies in Kazakhstan (Berentayev, 2001). In 
the “Kazakhstan-2030” Strategy published in 1997, Nazarbayev stressed that the shortage of “inter-
nal capital and savings, Kazakhstan became ever more dependent on the foreign capital, both on the 
private one and on the international ﬁnancial agencies” (Kazakhstan-2030, 1997, p. 9). Since 2000, 
Kazakhstan’s economy has grown rapidly, mainly because of the high prices of oil, metals and grain.
The HE system of Kazakhstan witnessed a number of negative developments in 1990s conditioned 
“by shortage or simply lack of funding” (Kusherbayev et al., 2001, p. 20). The state was able ﬁnance 
wages, stipends and meals, but not in full, and spending on HE decreased dramatically from 0.3% of 
GDP in 1991 to 0.04% in 1992, and constituted at only 0.32% of GDP in 2000 (Kusherbayev et al., 2001).
There were 61 HEIs in the early 1990s in Kazakhstan, with more than 280,000 students 
(Zhumagulov, 2012). All HEIs were state owned. The number of HEIs has grown dramatically since 
1993, when the Law on HE permitted the establishment of non-state HEIs. The number of private 
HEI increased to 123 in 2001 (National Report, 2004). In contrast, the number of state HEIs de-
creased to 47, which included 28 universities, 13 academies and 6 institutes in 2000–2001 (Zhakenov, 
2002). The decline in the number of state HEIs can be explained by the optimisation process which 
was undertaken by the government when pedagogical and technical institutes were converted into 
universities. Under a government resolution from 16 June 2000, the number of state HEIs was re-
duced further, when 12 state HEIs were reorganised into joint-stock companies (Zhakenov, 2002).
In terms of student enrolment, the number of students increased from 313,000 in 1998 (WB, 
2000, p. 144) to 442,400 in 2000 (Zhakenov, 2003), and 477,387 in 2014 (MoES, 2015). While by 
2002, the total enrolment constituted 514,000 students in all types of HEIs with 331,000 students 
enrolled in state HEIs, and 183,000 students in private HEIs (Zhakenov, 2003).
The large number of students in state HEIs can be explained by the fact that under the new 1999 
Law on Education the state HEIs were allowed to enrol students on a fee basis. Furthermore, private 
HEIs attested by the state became eligible to enrol students under the conditions of the State 
Educational Order. In 2002–2003, for instance, 169,000 students were admitted to HE; 24,500 of 
them were covered by the provisions of the State Educational Order, while another 144,500 were 
fee-paying students (Analytic Memorandum for 1999–2002, 2003). Thus, the contractual relation-
ship between the state and HEIs, the State Educational Order, which was introduced in an accelera-
tion phase of the perestroika period, continued to exist in the post-Soviet Kazakhstan. However, in 
the post-Soviet period, the students themselves became the consumers of educational services in-
stead of state enterprises of the perestroika period.
As was mentioned earlier, under the 1999 Law on Education, the principle of two-channel ﬁnanc-
ing for state HEIs was established, one from the state budget and another from fee-paying students. 
When “the republic’s budgetary funds cover expenditure on the wages of professorial and teaching 
staff and, partially, students’ stipends, while funds of the population cover expenditure on wages 
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and communal expenses” (Kusherbayev et al., 2001, p. 20). In the same year, in 1999, the extra-
budgetary earnings of state HEIs constituted 43% of the total amount of funding (Kusherbayev et 
al., 2001, p. 24), and by 2010, it made up over 85% of total revenues for HEIs (European Commission, 
2010). The number of students who receive government grants was less than 20% (Tempus, 2010).
In the early 2000s, private HEIs constituted a majority in the HE system. By 2002, for example, in 
total 171 HEIs were in existence, which included 34 state, 12 joint-stock companies, 3 international 
and 122 private institutions (Zhakenov, 2002). Private HEIs became an important source of income 
for the state; for example, in 1999, they “raised about T5 billion in tuition fees, or 35% of the national 
budget for education” (Asian Development Bank, 2004, p. 36). In other words, the economic-ﬁnan-
cial difficulties were supposed to be one of the main reasons for adjusting HE “to the conditions of a 
market economy” (Asian Development Bank, 2004, p. 35) in order to reduce its ﬁnancial 
commitments.
On the other hand, the state, by delegating most part of its mission to private HEIs, aligned with 
the WB’s recommendation to leave HE gradually to the “private sector to both ﬁnance and deliver” 
(WB, 2000, p. 38). It was considered that “further encouragement of the private sector to provide 
education services is an attractive policy option without any burden on the public budget” (WB, 
2000, p. 163).
6.2. Russia
Two months before the collapse of the Soviet Union, in October 1991, Yeltsin—the President of the 
Russian Federation, and his advisers established an ambitious programme of radical economic re-
forms with goals for macroeconomic stabilisation and economic restructuring (Aven, 2013; Curtis, 
1996). This so-called “shock therapy” programme called for sharp reductions in government spend-
ing, and “the shrinkage of inﬂation from 12% per month in 1991 to 3% per month in mid-1993” 
(Curtis, 1996). As a result of sharp decrease of the real GDP by about 40% between 1991 and the ﬁrst 
quarter of 1994 the state investments in education declined from 7% in 1970 to 3.4% in 1992 
(Deaver, 2009; Heyneman, 1995). Moreover, “state spending per student in 1997 was one-third of 
the amount spent in 1989” (Deaver, 2009, p. 353).
In 1990, the Russian HE system was composed of 514 higher educational institutions (HE in 1990 
1991). In 1990, the Minister of Education of the Russian Federation, Eduard Dneprov and the reform-
ers proposed to develop the private educational institution sector, and to adopt a new Law on 
Education in order to legalise the privatisation processes in education, which was passed in 1992 
(Johnson, 1997). Accordingly, the Law on Education, 1992, legalised the private sector as well as 
introduction of tuition fees in state higher educational institutions. Fee-paying programmes mainly 
were in the ﬁelds such as economics, management, law and humanities (Froumin, Kouzminov, & 
Semyonov, 2014). However, Aslund (1992) argues that private higher educational institutions were 
already in existence in Russia, in accordance with the Law on Co-operatives, 1988. Likewise, tuition 
fees were introduced from the end of 1980s in some of the Russian state higher educational institu-
tions, in the words of M.V. Kulakov—the vice rector for economic affairs at Moscow State University:
We need to work in two directions. First, obtaining and utilising budget resources; second, 
obtaining and utilising non-budget revenues. […] The second direction of the work is 
commercial activity. It can yield positive results. Thanks to this kind of activity, moreover, 
a number of faculties in the past two years have acquired the kind of equipment they 
didn’t have enough budget funds to buy, or they have renovated old equipment. How have 
they managed to do this? In particular, on the basis of partial commercialisation of the 
educational process. This year, the university council passed a decision according to which 
the faculties can charge tuition to 10 to 15% of the planned student enrollment. As a result, 
about 200 students were enrolled on a tuition basis. Kulakov (1991, pp. 64–65)
He also added that the other sources of revenue are: “in the juridical faculty it is a college of law; in 
the economic faculty it is a business school; in the philology faculty it is various language study 
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courses, including a system of tuition-charging instruction for foreigners (hard-currency tuition)” 
(Kulakov, 1991, p. 65). Thus, by 1992, “almost half of all VUZ [higher educational institutions] stu-
dents were paying tuition fees of one kind or another” (Jones, 1994, p. 13).
The number of students doubled between 1990s and 2000s (Platonova & Semyonov, 2016; 
Smolentseva, 2017). For example, in 1991 “there were 2,762,000 students, in 2000 that number was 
4,741,000, and it reached 7,513,000 by 2008, the peak” (Smolentseva, 2017, p. 7) which declined in 
the following years inﬂuenced by the demographic downturn in Russia.
The massiﬁcation of HE was related to the growth of a fee-paying students within state sector of 
HE whereas state tuition free places increased by only 20% between 1995 and 2005 (Smolentseva, 
2017). Although, at the same period “the number of tuition paying students in public institutions 
almost doubled, increasing by 92%” (Smolentseva, 2017, p. 8). The state-funded places are still al-
located via the State Educational Order (Froumin et al., 2014) which was introduced in the pere-
stroika period. These places “go to the most qualiﬁed students, and those entitled to guaranteed 
tuition free places (on the basis of disability, or a social basis such as being an orphan)” (Smolentseva, 
2017, p. 7). Other sources of income of the state HEIs of Russia are the part-time programmes 
(Froumin et al., 2014; Smolentseva, 2017).
Since 1992, over 450 non-state HEIs were established (Froumin et al., 2014). By 2003, the share of 
enrolments in private HE sector constituted approximately 10% from the total number of enrol-
ments in HE (Suspitsin, 2003) and “never exceeded 15–17%” (Smolentseva, 2017, p. 9). Unlike the 
Kazakhstani case “Russian non-state higher education institutions were not created by turning pub-
lic institutions into private but rather by organizing new institutions, virtually from scratch” (Suspitsin, 
2003, p. 15). In other words, they were established “not instead of state universities but, as a supple-
ment, enlarging the spectrum of educational services for the Russian population” (Geroimenko, 
Kliucharev, & Morgan, 2012, p. 78; emphasis in the original). Private HEIs are located in major cities 
of Russia and provide programmes in those ﬁelds that do not require much investment in equipment 
and research infrastructure such as economics, law, psychology, business administration, and so on, 
with mainly part-time enrolments (Smolentseva, 2017; Suspitsin, 2003).
6.3. Uzbekistan
The “Cotton Affair” referred to earlier, ﬁrst came to notice during the leadership of the General 
Secretary Andropov (1982–1984) which extended into the perestroika period. The name changed to 
the “Uzbek Scandal”, and high party and government officials of Uzbekistan were accused of corrup-
tion and falsifying cotton production ﬁgures, which led to a massive dismissals and arrests of high-
ranking officials. Thus, this “renewed campaign against Uzbek culture and the growing cotton 
scandal created considerable tensions among the republic’s elite, many of whom were implicated in 
the scandal, or accused of secretly engaging in Islamic or other ‘backward’ activities” (Hanks, 2005, 
p. 63) which caused the replacement of the ﬁrst party secretary in Uzbekistan in 1988. However, 
these policies and processes led to the growth of reactionary national consciousness since “the 
campaign looked like an attempt to single out and scapegoat Uzbekistan for Moscow’s mistakes in 
its economic policies and planning” (Dadabaev, 2016, p. 189). In addition, a strong resistance to the 
marketisation processes of the perestroika period was noticeable within the high officials of 
Uzbekistan (Furtado & Chandler, 1992).
In summer of 1989, an ethic clash between Uzbek and Meskhetian Turks took place in the Fergana 
Valley, in which hundreds died (Hanks, 2005). As a result, Nishanov was replaced with Islom Karimov, 
who acquired “a reputation for ensuring ‘stability’, and for promoting Uzbekistan’s heritage, particu-
larly with the passage of legislation making Uzbek the republic’s ‘official language’ just a few months 
after he took office” (Hanks, 2005, p. 64).
In the post-Soviet period, the economic reforms proceeded slowly and gradually (Ruziev & 
Rustamov, 2016) in contrast to the rapid restructuration of economy in Kazakhstan and Russia. 
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Privatisation of small-scale enterprises in the agricultural and ﬁnancial sectors were allowed where-
as strategically important enterprises and HE sector remained under state control (Ruziev & 
Rustamov, 2016). Spending on education declined from 9% of GDP in 1990 to 7% of GDP in 1995 
(Weidman & Yoder, 2010). The system of HE was regulated by the Ministry of Higher and Secondary 
Specialised Education, which was formed in January 7, 1990. The Ministry “sets strict rules for the 
recognition of new developed curricula according to the state educational standards” (HE in 
Uzbekistan, n.d., p. 2).
Since independence, the macroeconomic stabilisation and economic growth achieved in the mid-
1990s, constituting GDP growth by 1.6 and 5.2% in 1996 and 1997, respectively (Asian Development 
Bank, 2004). 1999, was also “characterized by macroeconomic stability with steady growth of GDP 
(4.4%), a small budget deﬁcit (1.8%), controlled inﬂation (1.9% monthly, 22.8% annually), and a 
foreign trade surplus ($125.1 million)” (Asian Development Bank, 2004, p. 93). Moreover, from the 
mid-2000s, the economy of Uzbekistan has shown and annual growth of around 8% (Ruziev & 
Rustamov, 2016).
Privatisation of small-scale enterprises in the agricultural and ﬁnancial sectors were allowed 
whereas strategically important enterprises and HE sector remain under state control (Asian 
Development Bank, 2004). The Law on Education was adopted in 1992; however, major educational 
reforms were launched in the second half of the 1990s. The number of HEIs increased steadily from 
46 in 1990 (HE in 1990 1991) to 58 by 1995–1996 (Ruziev & Rustamov, 2016).
The system of HE is regulated by the Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialised Education 
(MHSSE), which “sets strict rules for the recognition of new developed curricula according to the 
state educational standards” (HE in Uzbekistan, n.d., p. 2). Student enrolment in HEIs in 2008–2009 
totalled “297,900 students 271,800 full-time and 26,100 enrolled in correspondence courses” 
(UNDP, 2009, p. 2). The state expenditure in HE represented a decline from 1% in 1990 to 0.6% in 
2005 in GDP terms (UNDP, 2009, p. 6).
“The National Programme for Personnel Training” (NPPT) became the law in 1997. The reform 
programme of the education system included three-stage reform plan (Majidov, Ghosh, & Ruziev, 
2010) with a main focus on the expansion of vocational education. In accordance with the NPPT HE 
is based “on the secondary specialised education (academic lyceum), vocational specialised educa-
tion (professional college) and includes 2 levels: a Bachelor’s degree level and Master’s degree level” 
(HE in Uzbekistan, n.d., p. 2).
In 2015, there were “78 HEIs, comprising 11 comprehensive universities, 10 specialised universi-
ties, 35 institutes, 2 academies, 13 regional branches of HEIs, and 7 branches of foreign universities” 
(Ruziev & Burkhanov, 2016, p. 15) being almost all of HEIs are state-owned with an exemption of 
foreign HEIs’ branches. An enrolment in full-time study increased from around 180,000 to around 
250,000 in 1989 and 2015, respectively. Moreover, evening and part-time study programmes were 
abolished, and HE study is only on a full-time basis (Ruziev & Burkhanov, 2016, p. 12).
Soon after the independence, several private HEIs brieﬂy emerged. However, in 1993, only 
Tashkent Institute for International Economic Relations and Entrepreneurship (TIIERE) obtained an 
official licence, which was cancelled just a few months after (Ruziev & Rustamov, 2016).
7. Concluding discussion
This paper has attempted to explain the outcomes for HE from the perestroika period, and proposed 
the theory of “institutional dis/continuities”. The theory employs elements of historical institutional-
ism in the explanation of HE governance changes during the Soviet and post-Soviet periods in the 
countries under review, as historical institutionalism can explain the varying outcomes of national 
policies.
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From the point of view of historical institutionalism, it can be said that path-dependencies can 
indeed have a signiﬁcant impact on subsequent reform processes. The path-dependency concept is 
useful in explaining the continuities in historical development, when the patterns of past decisions 
are reiterated in current decision-making processes.
Historical institutionalism addresses also the institutional changes in historical development. The 
changes are explained by “critical junctures”. Therefore, the perestroika period is seen as a critical 
juncture in this paper. They may be caused by times of great uncertainty. The changes were dra-
matic in spite of the short timeframe. This critical juncture period is identiﬁable subject to a refer-
ence to the Soviet period.
In particular, the speed and scale, as well as the character of the perestroika period allows us to 
claim that this period represents a “critical juncture”, a period of signiﬁcant socio-economic and 
political upheaval. In other words, in this short period of time, the historical development of the 
Soviet Union moved onto a totally different path by destroying the foundations of the old socio-
economic and political structures.
The quick abandonment of the key institutional elements of the old system, namely, the political 
power of one party system—the Communist Party, and the centralised economy, created much 
confusion and uncertainty in the USSR as a whole. In the words of Collier and Collier (1991), these 
new conditions disrupted the previous reproduction mechanisms that is, prior path-dependencies, 
by creating the branching point—a critical juncture in historical development.
The concepts of uncertainty and contingency of the critical juncture approach are particularly 
relevant at this point of my analysis. In this short period of socio-political ﬂux, the political decisions 
and choices of key policy-makers put in place a new initial institutional setting which were followed 
by huge uncertainties and contingencies of events. The systematic comparison of the Soviet and 
perestroika periods has shown the clear differences in the institutional context. Therefore, the period 
of perestroika is considered as a critical juncture and the starting point for further path-dependent 
processes.
Following Capoccia’s (2015) suggestion that it is possible to see the dynamics of change by linking 
them to the decisions of key actors, it can be argued that the decisions of Gorbachev and his close 
allies were crucial in the processes of transformation in the USSR. Their signiﬁcance becomes par-
ticularly apparent when one considers the hierarchical nature of the one-party system that was in 
place in the Soviet Union. Under such a system, the voice of the Party’s leader would in fact have 
been a decisive factor in any decision-making process.
The perestroika period had also a very strong inﬂuence on the development of Soviet HE, in part 
because of the inherited tight relationship with the Soviet economy. Consequently, the economic 
reforms of perestroika dramatically changed the relationships of HE with the economy, establishing 
market-like relations between them. Moreover, the HEIs, in accordance with the Law on State 
Enterprises, became independent legal entities. The main principles of the relationship between 
higher educational institutions, research institutions and enterprises were changed completely. The 
new relations were to be based on direct contracts between them, which meant the establishment 
of market-like relations.
The emergence of new political and economic factors were taken into account in subsequent re-
forms of the HE system. The All-Union Congress of Educators formulated new directions of the HE 
system, which included a focus on democratisation, decentralisation, and increasing the independ-
ence of higher educational institutions. Consequently, as a result of much greater involvement of 
republic and local authorities, the governance of the former Soviet education system became far 
more distributed and complex. Moreover, the structural changes in central administration and plan-
ning organs considerably decreased the role of the centre over HE. This was a start of greater 
Page 14 of 18
Azimbayeva, Cogent Education (2017), 4: 1399968
https://doi.org/10.1080/2331186X.2017.1399968
diversity in the educational systems of Union-Republics. Under these circumstances, the centre 
played a rather formal role, while the different nationalities and ethnicities across the USSR began to 
establish their own distinctive education systems. In general, all these changes created huge uncer-
tainties and a great deal of ﬂuidity in the education system.
Turning back to the divergence analytical concept of the critical juncture approach, it can be ar-
gued that the use of antecedent conditions is useful at this stage. In line with Slater and Simmons’s 
(2010) argument, antecedent conditions in the form of different nationalities, religions and cultures 
of the Union-Republics, can be classiﬁed as critical antecedents, as they played a causal role in forms 
taken by the great diversiﬁcation of the Soviet HE system. In other words, they created the greater 
divergence in the educational development in the Union-Republics, and regions of the USSR. 
Moreover, according to Slater and Simmons (2010), these critical antecedents in combination with 
causal factors of a critical juncture, in the case of this study—the perestroika period, can be the start-
ing point of long-term diversiﬁcation. Therefore, the concept of divergence can explain the greater 
differences in education of former Union-Republics from the very outset of the collapse of the USSR.
In these three countries under review, patterns and processes in HE development have shown a 
considerable divergence that started from the perestroika period. My analysis suggests that the 
causal explanation of this trend may be captured in the following developments:
The political and economic systems that have developed since the perestroika period in these 
countries have signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced the processes of HE governance changes. In particular, lead-
ership changes following the events of “Cotton Affair” in Uzbekistan and “Zheltoksan” in Kazakhstan 
led to the strong national consciousness in these Central Asian countries. However, the outcomes 
varied considerably; in Uzbekistan, the government officials became resistant to the perestroika re-
forms whereas the reforms in Kazakhstan continued in line with the general policies of perestroika.
In contrast, the socio-economic reforms in Russia considerably outpaced the changes in other 
Union-Republics. For instance, the marketisation processes in education found its start in the pere-
stroika, and were retained in the post-Soviet Russia. In other words, the economic hardships forced 
Russia to engage with both types of marketisation in HE, an introduction of the tuition fees in state 
higher educational institutions as well as the establishment of private higher educational institu-
tions from the late 1980s. Subsequently, the Law on Education 1992 legalised these processes of 
marketisation in HE. By contrast, in Kazakhstan, it was only after the collapse of the Soviet Union the 
establishment of private higher educational institutions was permitted, while the Uzbekistani case 
on the other hand is considerably different; the HE sector remained under the state control and the 
private HE sector was/is not in existence.
Finally, some of the legislative authorities or the governmental bodies of the individual republics, 
which were formed during the perestroika period have remained in place following the collapse of 
the Soviet Union. For instance, in the case of Kazakhstan, the Supreme Soviet which was elected in 
the perestroika period adopted the ﬁrst legislation on education and HE in the post-Soviet period, in 
1992 and 1993, respectively. In Russian case, the reform minded Minister of Education and his allies 
initiated the adoption of the new Law on Education which legitimated the privatisation processes in 
education.
Overall, feelings of nationalism grew as the inﬂuence of the centre (Moscow) weakened. After 
gaining their sovereignties in 1990, the Union-Republics have sought to build their nation republics 
where an education system has a crucial role. Consequently, this has required strengthening the role 
of the nation-state over education.
Furthermore, the ﬁndings of the All-Union sociological survey (Higher Education. The Conception 
& Practice of Perestroika, 1991) should be considered in the analysis of post-socialist transforma-
tions as they included the following propositions for resolving the HE problems: introduction of 
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tuition fees and market mechanisms, and the establishment of the republic-level central adminis-
tration. Future Union-Republic policy-makers could take them into account in further decisions 
about the HE system in the individual republics.
Thus, the perestroika period can be seen as a signiﬁcant critical juncture, and the starting point of 
the long-term diversity in the education systems of post-socialist countries. This implies that it is 
necessary to examine in great detail the differences which took place in the perestroika period across 
the Union-Republics before they diverged, that is before the breakdown of the USSR. This implies 
that by identifying the perestroika period as a critical juncture, a time when post-Soviet countries 
turned to a new path, post-socialist educational transformations became even more diverse and 
unpredictable.
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